It is a fact that both the political and the security problems in Afghanistan have directly affected the stability of the region since Afghanistan is in the strategic position of Asia. The article presents an in-depth examination into the current situations of Afghanistan, particularly in regards to the nation's security dynamics. The U.S., the CSTC-A, GPPT, UNAMA, EUPOL, NATO and a lot of individual countries are interested in the reorganizing of the Afghan National Police (ANP) force with the aim of providing stability in the nation. The main problem is that each country or international organizations want to implement their own strategies and political purpose to rebuild the ANP. Therefore, Afghanistan faces enormous challenge in terms of security reform. After examining the security training efforts by international communities along with Turkey' contributions, recommendations are made to develop applicable, effective, and sustainable security reform that could be internalized by the Afghan officials.
Introduction
Police reform is considered a critical element in reconstruction and peace building activities in postwar countries. Professional police organization contributes to sustain internal security and facilitate the transition from military to civilian life at the community level. Civil war which lasted 27 years destroyed security institutions particularly national and local police unit, army, and judiciary system in Afghanistan. Moreover, Afghan civil war divided country into more ethnic and political pieces.
Afghan National Police (ANP) is an integral part of defense against insurgency, narcotic crimes and organized crimes. Despite of assistance of international community, the contribution of force in Afghanistan (Wilder, 2007) . After the period of Taliban in 2002, there were 50,000-70,000
police. The majority of them were illiterate (80 percent) and untrained, and they had no uniforms, discipline, facilities, equipment, and lacked of formal police skills and public trust. Another important problem for Afghan Police was ethnic imbalance. The most of commanders of Afghan Police were Tajik Afghans. Moreover, the local commanders and warlords had access more money than government. Civil war and the jihad against the Soviet Union had intensified ethnic tension and pushed local commanders to create their own militias. Therefore, the central control and systematic chain of command did not exist within Afghan Police under the Ministry of Interior (Murray, 2007, pp. 109-110) . Perito (2009) Germany as the Afghan Police Reform`s starting point by saying that "Officials in the Afghan Interim Authority recognized that international assistance would be required to create a new Afghan National Police. The Afghan Interim Authority wanted to create a new professional police service with educated officers and trained career noncommissioned officers and patrolmen. Based upon the positive experiences with German police assistance prior to the Soviet intervention, the Afghans welcomed Germany's selection as the lead nation for training and equipping the Afghan police" (p. 2-3).
A new comprehensive plan to rebuild Afghan National Police Force was prepared in 2002 by the German Government. The plan consisted of five main issues: advice on structure and organization of the force; the rehabilitation of Kabul Police Academy; the reconstruction of police buildings and institutions; the provision of equipment such as police vehicles; and coordination of all other donor activities that relate to policing (Sedra, 2003) . The rehabilitation of Kabul Police Academy and police trainings were the most significant parts of the German program.
Comprehensive training plan for the Afghan National Police aimed to create the Police Academy based on European Model that would offer 4 year university level training.
The comprehensive framework of the security sector reform of Afghanistan was set by 'lead nation' at the G8 donor`s conference in Geneva in 2002. According to Security sector reform plan, the United States would be responsible for the military; Germany would reorganize the police;
and Italy would reform judiciary. All donor countries were expected to share the burden to rebuild the security sectors in Afghanistan. Following years, the focus of attention of the United States and other international donors shifted from professional policing to operational policing, owing to the rapidly increase of security problem in Afghanistan (Hayes & Sedra, 2008) .
The establishment of the Law & Order Trust Fund (LOTFA) for Afghanistan in December 2002 was also considered an important milestone for Afghan Police Reform. The main objective Çiftçi, İ., & Kula, S. (2014) . How security problem of Afghanistan threatens the global world: Afghan police reform case. International Journal of Human Sciences, 11(2), 1041 Sciences, 11(2), -1061 Sciences, 11(2), . doi: 10.14687/ijhs.v11i2.2925 Sciences, 11(2), 1044 of the LOTFA, which was managed by the UN Development Program, was to cover budgetary expenses and salaries in security sector, to rehabilitate police buildings, to train police, and to develop law enforcement capacity in whole country. Before the establishment of the LOTFA, the Afghan Interim Administration could pay only 10 % of operational police cost. Therefore, the first priority of the LOTFA was salary cost. Even though the fund was not only a solvent per se, the Interior Ministry would not be able to sustain regular salary payment without the support of LOTFA (Murray, 2007, p. 110) .
Another important milestone was that Ali Ahmad Jalali, former professional military officer and a Pashtun Afghan-American journalist, was appointed as a Minister of Interior in 2003. Seven months later after his assignment, he proclaimed a plan of security reform. The main goals of his plan were to recruit 50,000 police force instead of conscripted solders, and to train 40,000 recruited police force in Kabul and other eight in-service training centers established by the US. Other important parts of the projects were creating national counter-narcotic, counter-terrorism and human rights unit and forming the National Security Directorate (NSD), a mixed model of the FBI and the CIA, related to national intelligent service. Currently, the NSD, having 23 directorates and 30,000 employees, is the most important and powerful institution in Afghanistan (Sedra, 2003, p. 34; Murray, 2007, p.111-112) .
Current Situation in Afghanistan
Both the political and the security problems in Afghanistan have directly affected the stability of the region since Afghanistan is in the strategic position of Asia. Owing to the transition rote of energy and the geopolitically importance, Afghanistan is a vital bridge between Euro-Asia and North-South. After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the United States and several allies entered Afghanistan to destroy the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization and its leader Osama bin Laden, and they overthrown the Taliban regime that supports terrorist activities. After the overthrow of the previous government, the interim Afghan government was established under the supervision of international powers. The current president Hamid Karzai was appointed as the head of state of the interim government for 6 months. Karzai was elected as the new president of Afghanistan as a result of election held on 11 June 2002 (Goodson, 2005, p.24) .
The United Stated, NATO and other donors tried to develop new security strategies which can rapidly provide stability in the country. As the security in all over the country is becoming worse, Afghanistan is the initial issue of the agenda for the US, NATO, and for the EU. Despite all efforts of the international community, the security of the country cannot be completely maintained. Currently, some parts of Afghanistan are being controlled by the Taliban groups or other insurgents. They are attacking the US` soldiers, international peace forces and the Afghan security forces, particularly against the ANP. The Taliban groups and insurgents are controlling only a little part of the country which is near the Pakistani border (Pandya, 2004) . The country's geographical structure is one of the significant factors preventing to struggle the attacks. The actions of suicide usually by car or on foot (suicide bomb), are still alive especially in Kabul.
However, it can be said that the safest location is the Kabul region in Afghanistan and the region is being supervised by the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) (Rubin, 2003) .
ISAF was established by UN Security Council Resolution of December 20, 2001, authorized for six months to assist the new Afghan government in order to maintain security. After its establishment, ISAF begun to serve in Kabul, and had 5,000 troops from nineteen countries.
ISAF is responsible for providing security in the capital where it conducted routine patrols with local police. However, there was really difficult to maintain the security with new lead nations. In
August 2003, the command of the forces changed hands indefinitely to NATO to solve the security problem. So, NATO was the first deployment outside Europe or North America (Perito, 2009, p. 2). Because of its expanding responsibility, ISAF took command of an increasing number of contributions, 90,000 from the US (http: www.isaf.nato.int, 2010).
The Organizational Structure of the Afghan National Police
According to Murray (2009) , "In democracies, there is usually a separation between policy and operational direction of the police. While policy direction is the responsibility of the government, operational direction is the responsibility of the chief of police." However, in Afghanistan, the situation is different; these two functions are not separate from each other. The
Minister of Interior is both the president of the cabinet and the head of the operational police.
Hence, "no system of checks and balances, no government oversight of operations and little policy expertise at senior levels of the ministry exist" (Murray, 2009, p. 194) . The Afghan National Police is responsible to the Minister of the Interior which consists of three deputy ministers and, police services are under the responsibility of a deputy minister for security. Police managers at the provincial organizations are accountable to deputy minister who is carried responsibility police services ( Figure 2 ). reform and pay reform decreased the number of a "bloated" officer cadre. For example, the major`s monthly salary was $ 84, patrolmen's salary was $ 70. As a result of the low pay salary, bribery and corruption within the police was common. Table 1 indicates the salary rates of Afghan police before and after reform. According to Afghan Law, the main role of the (ANP) is "to maintain civil order and public safety, protect the rights of citizen, support actions against insurgency, control national borders, and reduce the level of transnational and domestic crimes" (Afghanistan Security Report, 2008, p. 8) . However, the Afghan government needs more time to implement to these roles, and to maintain security and public safety.
The organization structure of Afghan police was developed according to the military structure by the Afghan government and international donors, because in the case of shortage of military personal to counter the insurgency, the Afghan government and the US use easily them in counter-insurgency operations.
International Power's Contributions to build the ANP
Reconstruction projects in Afghanistan since 2002, many states exhibit intensive efforts for developing and implementing these projects. The security sector reform of Afghanistan was divided into five sections: The U.S. was responsible for Afghan National Army (ANA); Germany, the ANP; Italy, the National Justice System; Japan, disarmament of illegal military groups; and the U.K., counter illicit drug trafficking. Excluding Japan's disarmament projects, other all projects are currently ongoing.
In addition to Germany, the U.S., the CSTC-A, GPPT, UNAMA, EUPOL, NATO and a lot of individual countries by means of bilateral agreements have been interested in the reorganizing of the Afghan National Police (ANP). One of the main reasons that slow process is undoubtedly having several stakeholders. Each country wants to implement its own strategies and political purpose to rebuild the ANP. Today, this is also enormous challenge in Afghanistan in terms of security reform.
Thruelsen suggests that "Multilateral agreements lack muscle, while bilateral agreements undercut the multilateral framework. Many bilateral agreements reflect the specific national agendas of the countries involved, keen to 'show the flag', and only a few want to be subject to EUPOL control. Each country would rather make its own bilateral commitments to the Afghan government, which leaves too many actors driven by individual strategies involved in the same project" (p. 85).
European Union Police Mission Efforts
The European Union Council, in (Perito, 2009, p. 11) .
The International Policing Coordination Board (IPCB)
In 2007 Even if the aim of the IPCB was to coordinate the international organization which dedicated to rebuild the ANP, so far it has been slow to take hold. Around twenty persons who are serving at the IPCB`s secretariat have a uncertain role. Although the secretariat has provided the standardization in curriculum between the various countries, their operations are not satisfying among different nations. The lead nations could not desirably contribute to the coordination board.
However, "with key international actors and donors coming from differing policing traditions and offering multiple, sometimes overlapping programs, it is vital that all work together to make the IPCB a forum for real coordination and planning"(Crisis Group Asia Report, 2007, p. 9).
The Activities of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)
The Provincial Reconstruction Team enterprise is a civil-military activity that is becoming as a primary mediator between the U.S. or donors and provincial governments throughout Afghanistan. In other words, PRTs in Afghanistan are a significant factor through which the international donors deliver assistance at the district and provincial level. Increasing security concerns in Afghanistan has again revealed the importance of professionalization in good management and training of police organization. The U.S., the EUPOL and others donors arrange short term and long term police training activities in PRTs. These trainings are given by instructors both from army and civilian police organization. The Turkish PRT, for instance, has 20 expert trainers from various police department such as Special Forces, Organized Crimes, Crime Scene Investigation, contingency force, and crime prevention. In addition, the Turkish PRTs have a special police team which contains twenty people, one police officer to carry out administrative tasks, and one police chief to coordinate and manage of all police services in order to maintain security Wardak and Cevizcan provinces. Turkish police officers served at the PRTs train the ANP in basic police skills, including crime investigation, management skills, evidence collection, operation techniques, and crime prevention. Apart from the Turkish PRTs, all donor`s PRTs have more than 5 police instructor, advisor, and solder trainers. Thus, in this purpose, the main objective of the PRTs is to train provincial police forces to maintain security in that region.
In addition, Italy, the U.K., Canada, and other coalition partners contributed to police assistance program. Police training and mentoring teams from these countries were deployed to their own Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), where they managed police training and offered equipment and technical assistance. "These bilateral efforts, which varied in size, were not always coordinated with the larger U.S. and EU programs. In general, they stressed the importance of community policing and taught civilian police skills, but they also reflected differing national policing philosophies and practices, adding on another level of confusion to an already bifurcated program" (Perito, 2009, p. 11 
The Auxiliary Police (ANPA) and the Public Protection Program (AP3)
By 2006, not only the ANP but also the U.S. and international organizations, could provide security in the country. In this respect, the U.S. developed new approaches to maintain security in Afghanistan. The first, the most important one, was the creation of the ANP Auxiliary which they deployed the high risk district in 21 provinces in order to provide security and to fight particularly insurgents. However, there is a big challenge between the ANPA and the regular ANP officers. The ANP officers have questioned "why the ANPA received the same salary and wore the same uniform". The main purpose of the ANPA is to control and secure checkpoint, to release the ANP for counterinsurgency operations. By 2007, 8300 ANPA members was trained by the U.S.
instructors, theoretical aspects such as ethics, police techniques, the Afghan constitution, and practical trainings such weapons, shooting, operation (Perito, 2009, pp. 9-10) . 
Turkey' Contributions for ANP Training
The Modular training is a training model for police organizations that are keen to teach and improve their candidates in the light of contemporary policing approaches which include the notions of democratic policing, community policing, and problem-oriented policing. Each module either as a whole or in part is adapted from in-service training courses given by different department of TNP. This gives the training program an exceptional benefit from different aspects.
First, each department that is responsible for its module assigns their training instructors who have practical experiences and years-long teaching experiences in their own fields. Second, rich course materials prepared by each department are used for trainings, which increase the quality of the program. Since modules are adapted from specialized in-service training courses, they include the practical applications of their relevant course subjects.
The Obstacles of The Police Reform
Police reform is one of the most significant and complex challenges especially in post- International community, particularly the U.S., has increasingly focused on the police reform to maintain security in Afghanistan since 2005. However, in one hand while they are trying to re-build the Afghan National Police, on the other hand they are dealing with lots of obstacles such as shortfall in resources, lack of coordination among donors, corruption and drug trafficking, and illiteracy.
Shortfall in Resources
The problem is "that countries often want their names up in lights next to their pet programs, sometimes administered by their own NGOs, everyone wants to send their children back to school; no one wants to pay military or police salaries" (Chesterman, 2002, p. 7) . Although more than 40 nations and international organizations and NGOs have offered funds, personnel, or equipment to support America`s efforts to train and equip, the problem still has not been solved in the country. Therefore, as a natural result of the lack of resources, in many regions of the country local governors have borrowed money from regional tradesmen and abused police files and rank 
Poor Coordination among Donors
Coordination is another persistent problem that shows no sign of disappearing. Donors' efforts in Afghanistan and its provinces have been almost for a specific purpose and defined by national interests. Because of poor coordination among donors and a lack of transparency in aid spending have seriously affected aid efficiency. Murray observes that:
"Germany and the United States had developed parallel reform schemes. There was a German senior adviser 'embedded' in the ministry for administrative reform but the Minister had also acquired an American adviser during the course of 2003. …..While the Germans had spent $3 million on the Academy and other amounts on other projects including $460,000 on ministry reform, the United States was spending millions more, although not necessarily any more strategically. Evidently, two different approaches to police-building were developing. One cautious and rational, building on what already existed and extending outwards, and the other bold and sweeping, attempting to tackle a number of pressing problems all at the same time" (Murray, 2007, p. 112-113) .
The Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) report indicates this situation as; "The endless stream of coordination structures and meetings has only made a minor contribution to untying this Gordian knot; what has been missing is leadership, particularly from the heavyweight donors like the United States, the European Commission, the United Kingdom and Japan" (CIGI Report, 2009, p.9) . As a result, the Obama Administration focuses on a new strategy for Afghanistan that emphasizes coordination among international actors in the country.
Corruption and Illicit Drug Issues
Corruption and benefiting from drug trafficking within police forces, in Kabul and other provinces, are tremendous obstacles to reorganize the ANP through international organizations, the U.S. and, the Afghan government. According to the Afghanistan Security Report of the United
States Government Accountability Office (2008), the 87 percent of weekly reports is related to corruption within the police force or the Minister of Interior. The report notes that the corruption includes bribery and misconduct which is very common in high ranking officials. Furthermore, in early 2007, the highway police was disbanded because of bribery and misconduct. Nonetheless, delaying in payments of the police salaries, sometimes several months, is an important factor pushing the police to accept a bribe. On account of the Minister of Interior`s traditional salary distribution system, the police chiefs skimmed their subordinates` salaries for themselves. In spite of the fact that the government has begun to pay all salaries via electronic fund transfer into bank account in order minimize skimming of salaries after 2008, the transfer has been only implemented in 12 of 34 provinces.
Afghanistan is the largest opium producer of the world, accounting for 92 % of global production. Therefore, the counternarcotics effort of the Afghan government has limited effect on opium and heroin production. Illicit drug producing and trafficking provide incredible benefits for the tribal leaders, warlords, al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other terrorist groups in Afghanistan and region. However, beyond funding terrorist groups and other criminal, the revenue from illicit drug producing and trafficking cause the wide spreading of corruption in all levels of the Afghan government. With regards to this problem, Perito states that "Interior Minister Officials, police chiefs, and member of ANP are involved with drug trade. Combination local loyalties, links of criminal networks, low or no pay, and residual culture of impunity contributed to endemic corruption in the ANP" (Perito, 2009, p. 6-7) .
Illiteracy
The high rate of illiteracy in the Afghan National Police is another significant problem for In Afghanistan, the author, İrfan Çiftçi, taught two classes that lasted three month; only 2 police officers of 60 could read and write. As result of this, the course was divided two sections; one section was related to policing skills, morning and afternoon; the other section was literacy training, in evening. Wardak Police Department liked this model police training which called Turkish Model Training by the U.S. provincial monitors.
government at the end of 2014 (Barfield, 2011) . The year of 2014 will be a transition date for Afghan politics. Obscurity remains for all fields, especially for security.
Recommendations for Police Reform
Despite of a lot of efforts of international organizations and donors, police building reform in Afghanistan have come across important problems. Due to the urgency of security issues in the country, there have been some shortcomings in the strategies that are follows (Murray, 2007, p.117) . There are three main problems in police reform: attention gaps, knowledge gaps, and implementation gaps (Marenin, 2005) .
One of the important example of attention gaps is related to insufficient strategy of the U.S.
concerning to the ANP. The main aim of this strategy was to increase police numbers, provide more equipment, train new recruits and present police, and use the ANP in the fight against the Taliban insurgents. However, this strategy did not work because the U.S. ` strategy was not focusing on protecting Afghan civilians at the first period of American forces' presence.
Nonetheless, although there are a lot of differences between the Afghan police and Afghan army, the U.S. approach has gradually militarized the Afghan police for nine years (Perito, 2009, p. 13) . This is also significant challenge for the ANP because democratic policing in the world focuses to control crime and protect civilians. If the U.S. wants to succeed in the ANP reform, it should change the strategy after this period and focus on the sustainable security reform in Afghanistan.
For this purpose, as a first step, the Afghan National Army (ANA) should be used in fighting against the heavily armed Taliban insurgents.
Regarding the knowledge gap in the police reform, Marenin suggests that police rebuilding reform often ignores the 'exciting' body of knowledge on the structure, nature, practices and cultures of policing (Marenin, 2005) . Police training is a significant example of the "knowledge gap". Murray says that trainings are "largely developed and delivered by operational police. They know their métier functional roles and responsibilities but are not experienced trainers and have received little or no guidance from a professional trainer. The achievement of training objectives, such as knowledge transfer and competency development, is thus sabotaged by ineffective training methods, poor learning materials, bad examples and sometimes outdated information." Moreover, especially for the Afghan police it is really hard to learn something "from sitting on a hard seat in a classroom that is too hot in the summer and too cold in the winter, listening for several hours a day to an instructor speaking an unintelligible language, which has to be translated by, often untrained, interpreters uncertain of police terminology, without the support of words written in the local language on the board, good training materials or any sort of audio-visual support" (Murray, 2007, p. 119) .
Implementation gaps stem from frequently lack of coordination and different system policing. Whilst Germany in particularly and Norwegian arranges European system police training at the non-commission officer level, the U.S. gives lectures on common laws and policing principles at the military level (Murray, 2007, p. 121) . Another problem is to implement different type of curriculum in police trainings. Therefore, all countries that performed efforts for training of the Afghan police should agree on a common curriculum which will bring the standardization for police trainings. International organizations and individual countries having bilateral agreements with Afghan government can arrange the same training program for whole country.
Conclusion
Domestic and international actors in the Afghan police reform have failed to discern between strategic, operational and political decision making. Currently, the Afghan Interior Ministry has not performed any noteworthy effort in supporting and overseeing the ANP, although the ANP operated under the ministry of interior. This problem stems from the lack of strategic and operational thinking. One of the main factors that will contribute to success is to provide ministerial support and supervision for the ANP that can operate effectively against insurgents and criminals in Afghanistan.
Besides, it is greatly significant to improve the criminal justice system of Afghanistan. As previously stated, Italy was responsible the law and justice reform in Afghanistan. However, until now, it is hard to mention that the justice reform has been effectively operated throughout the country by donor. The main reason is that operations for improving courts and prisons have fallen behind the enormous expenditures to rebuild the ANP. Therefore, "the ANP cannot perform effectively in the absence of the criminal justice system; courts and prisons" (Perito, 2009, p. 14) .
In addition to security problems in Afghanistan, the high rate of illiteracy is the fundamental problem for both people and institutions, and international actors. All countries should agree to develop a comprehensive project that could solve this vital problem at the earliest level. If the U.S. and its allies can focus on illiteracy in the country at beginning of intervention, the problem will be solved following ten years. Otherwise, international actors and the Afghan government will not reach the basic human recourses standards for deploying the security forces.
Consequently, The U.S., NATO, and other international organizations will not be stay in
Afghanistan forever. Since all U.S. troops are about to withdrawal by the end of the year 2014 if no security agreement between Afghan and US officials is signed, the US and the coalition forces should develop applicable, effective, and sustainable security reform that will be internalized by the Afghan people. Otherwise, it will be very difficult to maintain security in Afghanistan. Therefore, the security problem in Afghanistan will continue to threaten the global security.
